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ABSTRACT 
In this paper, I show that the European Union (EU) is less than a state, but more than an 
international organization. Although it possesses some characteristics of both, the European 
Union is, I argue, a sui generis project: Although the EU wields extensive influence in some 
policy areas (such as competition policy or international trade regulation), its institutions‟ powers 
are quite limited in many areas that remain firmly within the grasp of its Member States‟ 
governments (such as security, justice, tax or redistribution policies). The European Union‟s 
supranational elements – especially the EU laws‟ supremacy over the laws of individual Member 
States – distinguish it, furthermore, from international organizations, such as the United Nations 
or the World Trade Organization. I conclude that the European Union is really a sui generis 
project that has not been attempted anywhere else: As such, it could be regarded as a useful case 
study, or perhaps even a “pilot project,” for regional integration projects elsewhere. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In this paper, I show that the European Union (EU) is less than a state, but more than an 
international organization. Although it possesses some characteristics of both, the European 
Union is, I argue, a sui generis project: Although the EU wields extensive influence in some 
policy areas (such as competition policy or international trade regulation), its institutions‟ powers 
are quite limited in many areas that remain firmly within the grasp of its Member States‟ 
governments (such as security, justice, tax or redistribution policies). The European Union‟s 
supranational elements – especially the EU laws‟ supremacy over the laws of individual Member 
States – distinguish it, furthermore, from international organizations, such as the United Nations 
or the World Trade Organization. 
My argument proceeds as follows: First, I outline some arguments that have been offered 
in the long-standing debate about the nature of the European Union, and explain why this debate 
is important. I then explain why the Union is less than a state: Its institutions do not have a large 
influence in many areas that national governments consider crucial. Next, I argue that the EU‟s 
supranational powers make it more than just another international organization: Unlike the 
world‟s international organizations, the EU requires that its Member States cede some of their 
sovereignty to the Union‟s common institutions. I conclude by arguing that the European Union 
is really a sui generis project that has not been attempted anywhere else: As such, it could be 
regarded as a useful case study, or perhaps even a “pilot project,” for regional integration 
projects elsewhere. 
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THE DEBATE ABOUT THE NATURE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 
The nature of the European Union – both the positive question of what the EU is, and the 
normative issue of what it should be – has been hotly debated ever since its humble beginnings 
as the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in the 1950s.
2
 Pollack (2005) points out 
that, in the European Union‟s history, periods of increased centralization (such as the 1950s, and 
the renewal of the integration process under the Delors Commission in the 1980s) alternated with 
periods of retrenchment and devolution (for instance, the Charles de Gaulle-led backlash during 
the 1960s).
3
 
The debate about the EU‟s nature is an important one: This is especially true in light of 
the recent controversies about the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty – where, for instance, the euro-
skeptic President of the Czech Republic Václav Klaus threatened to withhold his signature
4
 - as 
well as in light of frequent arguments about the proper role and scope of the European Union‟s 
powers. On the one hand, some commentators, mostly euro-skeptical ones, have likened the 
European Union to a federal state, with powers that are perhaps too strong.
5
 Others have argued 
that the EU is too weak, and needs to increase the scope of its activities.
6
  
A related debate revolves around the perceived “democratic deficit” of the European 
Union – a sense that its institutions may not be fully democratically legitimate.7 Some scholars, 
such as Moravcsik (2002) and Majone (1998), argue that the Union does not, in fact, suffer from 
a significant deficit, while others disagree (Follesdal and Hix, 2006). Understanding how far the 
                                                          
2
 To achieve greater simplicity in exposition, I will refer to the European Union‟s predecessor institutions (such as 
the European Coal and Steel Community and the European Community) simply as „the European Union‟ throughout 
the essay. This approach is common in academic literature. 
3
 Pollack (2005); Donahue and Pollack (2001), 98 
4
 Daily Telegraph, “Czech President Vaclav Klaus signs EU Lisbon Treaty into law,” 3 November 2009 
5
 The Economist, “Britain‟s Eurosceptics Show Their True Colours,” 4 March 2009 
6
 For instance, Scharpf (1999) 
7
 Moravcsik (2002) 
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current powers of the European Union extend is a good starting point for an informed debate on 
these important issues. 
 
LESS THAN A STATE: WHERE THE EU‟S POWERS ARE LIMITED 
A superficial glance at the institutional structure of the European Union reveals there are 
some similarities with the frameworks of its Member States‟ political institutions. The European 
Commission has, for instance, been described as “the executive body of the European Union.”8 
This description is, however, somewhat incomplete, as the European Commission has the 
monopoly right of legislative initiative: It is the only EU institution that can, usually after 
extensive consultation within the Commission and with experts from Member States (a process 
also known as “comitology”), propose new legislative acts (“directives”) of the European Union. 
This exclusive right is, of course, a law-making, rather than an executive, function – a fact that 
belies the description of the European Commission as a purely executive organ.
9
  
Some commentators have also noted that the European Commission resembles, in its 
structure, the executive branches of modern states: According to these accounts, the President of 
the European Commission is analogous to a Prime Minister, the College of Commissioners
10
 is 
the counterpart of an executive cabinet, and the individual Directorates-General are comparable 
to government ministries responsible for individual policy areas.
11
  
Similar arguments have been made about the European Parliament, the only branch of the 
EU that is directly elected,
12
 which has been described as the European counterpart of the lower 
chamber of national parliamentary assemblies. The Council of the European Union (and, before 
                                                          
8
 European Union (2010), “The European Commission” 
9
 Tsebelis and Garrett (2000) 
10
 European Union (2010), “The European Commission” 
11
 See, for instance, Chalmers, Davies and Monti (2010). 
12
 Moravcsik (2002), 604 
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the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the Council of Ministers as well) is 
sometimes described as a hybrid executive-legislative body, and at other times as the European 
analogue of an upper chamber of a national legislature, representing the Member States.
13
 
Although arguments from structural similarities between the political institutions found 
on the European Union level and those found on the level of its Member States can be appealing, 
they are fundamentally misleading: The European Union has very limited powers in some policy 
areas that are most important to, and indeed may be the defining characteristics of, modern 
states. These include, among other, the powers of taxation and spending, as well as policies in 
the realms of justice, law enforcement, and national defense and security. The European Union, 
in other words, clearly does not wield powers commensurate to those typically associated with 
modern states: It is, in this sense, less than a state. 
The political scientist Andrew Moravcsik, for instance, argues that the Union‟s current 
activities, however, are restricted both by the EU treaties and by established practice to a 
relatively modest subset of the substantive activities pursued by modern states. He argues, in 
particular, that “[the European Union‟s] mandate focuses primarily on the regulation of policy 
externalities resulting from cross-border economic activities.”14 The Union‟s strongest 
constitutional powers lie, for the most part, in the areas of international trade of goods and 
services (including agricultural commodities), competition policy, exchange rates and monetary 
policy, and in trade-related consumer and environmental regulation.
15
 The result is similar to 
what the EU scholar Giandomenico Majone and others, such as Kelemen (2004), have called “a 
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 Pollack (2005), Jachtenfuchs (2002) 
14
 Moravcsik (2002), p. 607 
15
 Ibid. 
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regulatory state.”16 We shall see that this notion of a “state,” however, is quite limited in scope 
when compared against the functions commonly performed by modern states. 
Importantly, the European Union is not very active in policy areas that are most crucial to 
the governments of modern states:  Its institutions are, moreover, expected to abide by the 
principle of „subsidiarity,‟ which Pollack (2005) defines as “the notion that the EU should 
govern as close as possible to the citizen,” and that it should regulate “only where necessary to 
ensure the completion of the internal market and/or other fundamental aims of the treaties.”17 
The EU, for example, only has a very limited ability to tax, and – although it does manage and 
supervise the EU budget – it largely relies on the national and local governments to do the 
spending, and set priorities for fiscal policy.
18
 Moravcsik (2002) estimates that the EU‟s ability 
to tax is limited to about three percent of national and local government spending – equivalent to 
less than two percent of the Member States‟ gross domestic products. By contrast, the national 
and local governments of the EU‟s member states collect taxes that amount to much larger 
proportions of their national incomes: According to data published by the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development, these proportions range from about thirty percent of 
GDP in Slovakia to almost fifty percent in Sweden.
19
 
The European Union, furthermore, is largely unengaged in social welfare policy: 
Traditional redistribution and social protection programs – such as pension schemes, the 
provision of unemployment and welfare benefits, or health insurance policies – remain in the 
hands of the Member States, and indeed vary widely across them.
20
 Some programs that the 
                                                          
16
 Majone (1998), Kelemen (2004) 
17
 Pollack (2005), 30 
18
 Moravcsik (2002) 
19
 Data collected by OECD (2007). 
20
 See Pierson (1995) for a comparative perspective on the social policies of various European countries. 
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European Commission supervises do have significant distributional effects:
21
 Two major 
examples are the Common Agricultural Policy, a complex and controversial system of 
agricultural subsidies, and the EU Structural and Cohesion Funds, which include the European 
Social Fund (ESF) focused on “mak[ing] Europe's workforce and companies better equipped to 
face […] global challenges” and on giving European “better skills and better job prospects,”22 as 
well as the European Regional Development Funds (ERDF), which aim “to promote economic 
and social cohesion [in the EU] through the reduction of imbalances between regions or social 
groups.”23 On the whole, however, European Union institutions are not responsible for the wide 
range of redistribution and social welfare programs that we see in most modern states. 
If a state is, as Max Weber has famously put it, an entity with a monopoly on the 
legitimate use of force,
24
 the European Union is most certainly not one: In fact, the Union‟s 
coercive powers are quite limited. Although some law enforcement cooperation is facilitated on 
the European Union level (for instance through EUROPOL, “the European Police Office”25), this 
collaboration focuses mostly on transnational issues such as “preventing and combating 
terrorism, unlawful drug trafficking and other serious forms of organized crime.”26 Member 
States have their own, largely independent, law enforcement systems.
27
  
The European Union, furthermore, plays only a very limited role in national defense 
policies: Even though, formally, the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) is a major 
part of the EU‟s Common Security and Foreign Policy, little progress has been made in creating 
                                                          
21
 Borrell and Hubbard (2000); Becker, Egger and von Ehrlich (2010) 
22
 European Union (2010), “European Social Fund” 
23
 European Union (2010), “Structural Funds: 2000-2006” 
24
 Max Weber (1999), “Politics as a Vocation” 
25
 EUROPOL (2002) 
26
 Ibid. 
27
 Moravcsik (2002), Gabel (1998) 
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EU-specific military capabilities.
28
 Instead, Europe‟s security remains largely in the hands of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), an international organization that was created in 
1949 to be a bulwark against Soviet influence, and that is independent of the European Union.
29
 
All in all, then, it appears clear that the scope of the European Union‟s powers is not 
extensive enough to warrant the Union‟s description as a state: “At a first approximation,” as 
Moravcsik correctly observes, “the EU does not tax, spend, implement or coerce and, in many 
areas, it does not hold a legal monopoly of public authority.”30  
One statistics illustrates the EU‟s limited power particularly well: European Union 
institutions employ a relatively small staff. The European Commission, for instance, employs 
about 23,000 civil servants.
31
 Although critics of the European Union often complain that it is a 
bloated bureaucracy, the number of EU‟s employees is comparable to that employed by the 
municipal government of a larger European city:
32
 a number that would seem extraordinarily 
meager for the government of a full-fledged state, but one that appears less surprising for an 
entity with powers largely limited to various types of international regulation. 
 
MORE THAN AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION: EU‟S SUPRANATIONAL ELEMENTS 
 International relations theorists, especially those of the realist school of thought such as 
Mearsheimer (1994) or Waltz (2000), often stress that the world of international politics is 
characterized by “anarchy:” There is, in other words, no sovereign above individual states that 
would enforce agreements, or punish those who deviate from previous commitments.
33
 As a 
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 Conley (2007) 
29
 Ibid. 
30
 Moravcsik (2002), 608 
31
 European Union (2010), “European Commission” 
32
 Ibid. 
33
 Mearsheimer (1994) 
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result, cooperation between states often proves to be difficult, as states can sometimes choose to 
defect from existing agreements, if it serves their own interests. Scholars of a liberal 
institutionalist bent generally accept the realists‟ premise of a fundamentally anarchic world 
order, but stress the role of institutions, which states can judiciously use to facilitate cooperation 
and maintain credible commitments.
34
 The European Union takes the liberal institutionalists‟ 
argument even further, and introduces supranational elements – ones which require that 
“individual countries delegate part of their authority to the European […] institutions.”35 
The European Union differs from traditional international organizations in one key 
respect: Unlike, for instance, the United Nations or the World Trade Organization, the European 
Union does not rely solely on the intergovernmental cooperation of fully sovereign states, but 
also has important supranational characteristics: Its Member States cede some of their 
sovereignty in favor of the European Union‟s common institutions. Accordingly, candidate 
countries have, in recent enlargement rounds, generally had to hold accession referenda, in which 
the populace was asked whether they agreed to join the Union: The ceding of some degree of 
national sovereignty is, after all, a politically sensitive matter.
36
 
The most important of the EU‟s supranational features is the supremacy of European 
Union law: Laws promulgated by European institutions are not only binding, but also take 
precedence over the Member State‟s domestic legislative acts.37 There are, furthermore, 
institutional mechanisms – shared between the two “guardians of the Treaties”: the European 
                                                          
34
 Keohane (1994), Grant and Keohane (2005) 
35
 A definition offered by Jean Monnet, then the President of the High Authority (a predecessor of the European 
Commission) of the European Coal and Steel Community, in 1955, as cited by Williams (1997) and Ruszkowski 
(2009). 
36
 Keohane (2004).  
37
 Scott and Trubek (2002) 
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Commission and the European Court of Justice – that allow the European Union to intervene, if 
they suspect a Member State is in violation of European Union treaties or laws.  
In particular, the European Commission can initiate a non-compliance procedure, known 
as “infringement proceedings,” against a Member State that it believes is failing to uphold its 
obligations under European Union law.
38
 As a first step in this pre-litigation procedure, the 
European Government sends the Member State a “letter of formal notice,” and requests a reply 
by a specified date. In light of the Member State‟s reply or its lack of response, the European 
Commission may decide to prepare a “reasoned opinion,” in which it will detail the infringement 
that the Member State is suspected of having committed. As a last resort, the European 
Commission may refer the dispute to the European Court of Justice, thus initiating the formal 
litigation procedure.
 39 
Another feature of the European Union that can be seen, in some respects, as 
“supranational” is the requirement that central EU institutions make decisions that are in the 
interests of the European Union as a whole (i.e., that they promote the „common good‟ of the 
Union),
40
 rather than in the interests of particular Member States. This is evident, for instance, in 
the European Commission: Although individual Commissioners are nominated by the 
governments of Member States, they are expected to be independent and act in the general 
European interest, rather than to defend the interests their home countries.
41
 Such an approach 
sharply contrasts with intergovernmental negotiations in international organizations such as the 
                                                          
38
 European Union (2010), “Infringement Proceedings” 
39
 Ibid. 
40
 Gabel (2009) 
41
 Ibid. 
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World Trade Organization, where parties often pursue their own interests – sometimes at the cost 
of a deadlock in, or a breakdown of, the negotiations.
42
 
 
CONCLUSION: THE EUROPEAN UNION AS A SUI GENERIS PROJECT 
All in all, we have seen that, while the institutional framework of the European Union 
exhibits some characteristics typical of states and others more commonly associated with 
international organizations, it cannot be readily categorized as either.  
Unlike most modern states, the European Union concerns itself only with a limited range 
of policy areas: These are largely restricted to various regulatory policies, mostly to do with 
international trade and monetary policies. On the other hand, the European Union is not a pure 
international institution either, because its activities are not conducted solely on the 
intergovernmental level (between the governments of sovereign and independent states), but also 
have a supranational dimension: This is particularly true of EU law, which is binding for all 
Member States, and reigns supreme over national and local statutes or regulations. The European 
Union, then, is less than a state, but more than an international institution. 
Instead, it is more useful to think of the European Union as a sui generis project. It is 
unique in several respects: It is an “economic project with political goals,”43 first initiated by 
visionaries such as Jean Monnet and Robert Schumann,
44
 that has, over time, expanded both its 
geographical span and the number of policy areas that it regulates,
45
 while – at the same time – 
stopping short of acquiring the extensive powers characteristic of modern states. The institutional 
                                                          
42
 For instance, several rounds of global trade negotiations – typically conducted on an intergovernmental basis - 
have either stalled or broken down. For an example involving the Doha round of trade negotiations, see Hufbauer 
and Pischedda (2007). 
43
 Bunse (2010) 
44
 Dinan (2005), Chapter 1 
45
 Pollack (2005) 
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framework of the European Union has been likened, imprecisely, to the three branches of 
government – executive, legislative and judiciary - found in modern states. In reality, however, 
its institutions often combine legislative and executive powers, as can be seen, for instance, in 
the European Commission‟s monopoly right of legislative initiative. The European Union, 
furthermore, combines intergovernmental forums, quite familiar from the world‟s many 
international organizations, with unique supranational institutions. Finally, as the world‟s largest 
and most extensive regional integration project, the European Union is bound to be closely 
observed by academics, policy-makers and the world public alike, as regional integration 
continues to deepen around the world.
46
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